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COMPARISON OF TRENDS IN NATIONAL
LAW: THE PACIFIC RIM
Ron W. Harmer*
INTRODUCTION
This paper is a contribution to that part of the Symposium
which considers comparative trends in the national insolvency
laws of various countries. In considering these trends, the
question "Rescue or Liquidation?" is asked. This provides a
very good place to begin because while there may be some rela-
tively common agreement about what is meant by the label
"liquidation," there may be some considerable difference of
view, sometimes passionate, about what is meant by "rescue."
So it may be best, at first, to attempt to give some meaning to
them.
Then, having hopefully defined the scope, a review will be
made of insolvency law trends in Australia, Japan, China, and
Vietnam. That selection from the many countries which border
the "Pacific Rim" will provide the opportunity to demonstrate
some quite marked differences between them.
This paper does not attempt a detailed analysis of the
issues concerning liquidation and rescue, nor of the laws of the
respective countries that are reviewed and, so, much of what
follows is necessarily impressionistic.
I. LIQUIDATION
The term or concept of "liquidation" (or "bankruptcy," as it
is sometimes termed) may not require much in the way of
definition for it is, or should be, relatively well understood. It
has a long historical and well-documented meaning.1 It may
be most conveniently described as a conservative insolvency
process which effects the immediate or prompt cessation of the
business activities of an insolvent debtor; a sale of the assets,
usually in piecemeal form, and, ultimately, the distribution of
* B.A., LL.B (Sydney). Robson Rhodes Senior Research Fellow, Centre for
Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary & Westfield College, University of London.
1. See generally 1 J.H. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVEN-
CY AND BANKRUPTCY § 1.02, at 1-4 to 1-12 (1986).
1 BROOK. J. INTL L.
the proceeds to creditors. The debtor enterprise or corporation
is usually extinguished during, or as a result of, the process.
Liquidation seems to have started life as a remedy for the
merchant and trader class.2 That is not surprising when it is
remembered that the insolvency laws of most countries in their
origin and subsequent development were made for, and heavily
influenced by, the requirements of merchants and traders. In-
deed, it was traders and merchants, through their guilds or
associations, who were initially responsible for a large part of
the application and administration of such laws. It should,
therefore, not be considered remarkable that liquidation was
considered the appropriate remedy to be applied to one of their
number who became unable to meet his financial commit-
ments. Those commitments would normally be due to fellow
traders. So the remedy could hardly be other than one which
would stop the trade of the merchant, dismember his assets,
and effectively extinguish him from further trade and com-
merce.
Although there was little legal thought and certainly no
economic theory then applied in justification of such a remedy,
it was certainly pragmatic since, it may be argued, it was there
to serve and protect the merchant class. It was used, quite
legitimately, as a means of effecting a disqualification from,
and maintaining appropriate standards within, the ranks of
the merchants.
It was a considerable time before a justification based
upon economic theory came to be applied to the process of
liquidation. The underlying principle of this theory was that in
a true market economy uncompetitive and inefficient traders
would not survive. Those who failed the test of competition
should be put out of business. This theory, based on the appli-
cation of elementary and somewhat raw market "competition"
principles, was probably grabbed rather than reasoned as it
came to be applied in justification of a bankruptcy or liquida-
tion law. Fortuitously, it must have suited the merchants be-
cause it roughly equated to their philosophy. But it seems to
have cemented the idea that liquidation was the only remedy
2. See John C. McCoid II, The Origins of Voluntary Bankruptcy, 5 BANKR.
DEV. J. 361, 361-62 (1987); DAvn) G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUP TC 1 (1993);
Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65
AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 334-35 & n.59 (1991).
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for traders who became insolvent. Reinforcement, if it was
needed, came from the legal theory that liquidation provided
the most orderly means of dealing with a bankrupt or insol-
vent estate.
Much later, other and more reasoned and plausible eco-
nomic justifications for liquidation took hold. But by this time,
liquidation was viewed more as both a legal and economic
process than a "remedy." Bankruptcy or liquidation was justi-
fied by pointing to a collective economic benefit which came
from the creation of a common pool of property in which all
creditors might share.3 Additionally, it could be justified be-
cause of the economies produced by interralising the costs of
the process.
It was this thinking that marked the beginning of the
scholarly application of both legal and economic thought to
insolvency law. But, and possibly more importantly, it un-
doubtedly opened up the prospect of examining and question-
ing the liquidation process from new perspectives. This led to
the emergence of that which might be best described as "res-
cue" economics.
Before moving to that, there is one more observation that
should be made about the word "liquidation." It is sometimes
used, in a related context, in contrast to "bankruptcy." The
principal source of this alternative use is found in countries
which formerly conducted command economics and which are
now engaged in a revolution of economic change or transition.
Considerable upheaval has been caused in these countries
because, to implement economic change, it became imperative
to reorganise the state-run system of production. The
reorganisation centered on the state-owned enterprise sector.
This sector was, in general, littered with hopelessly debt-rid-
den enterprises, incapable of competing in anything approach-
ing a market economy. A number of varying policies have been
employed in attempting to either dismember the sector entirely
or reorganise the individual enterprises to suit the different
economic structures which have emerged among the various
countries. Among the techniques employed in pursuit of that
policy has been that of liquidation. In that context, however,
3. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LnITs OF BANKRUIwcy LAW 10-
19 (1986).
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liquidation has come to mean a process of "asset divestment."
A very good example can be found in the reunified Germany.
In May 1990, specific purpose legislation (which created a
powerful administrative body commonly known as the
Treuhandanstalt)4 was enacted to effect economic policies to
deal with the state enterprise sector of the former East Germa-
ny. Under that legislation, administrative processes were em-
ployed to restructure individual state enterprises to the point
where they might be privatised. The measures were largely a
success. But for state enterprises that could not be privatised,
the legislation provided for a liquidation process which in-
volved a gradual and orderly sale of their assets. Many of
these enterprises had an excess of liabilities over assets which,
under normal circumstances, would have required them to be
liquidated under a bankruptcy process. To avoid this, a consul-
tative bargaining process was employed with creditors of these
state enterprises.5 The aim of this process was to reach agree-
ment with the creditors on the reduction of their claims to a
level equal to the proceeds of the liquidation, but not as low as
that which might be occasioned by a formal bankruptcy pro-
cess. This was largely achieved by endeavouring to keep the
businesses of the enterprises "operational" and by selling them
at going concern values.
The point of interest in all of this (which, hopefully, will
have some relevance when we turn to consider what is meant
by "rescue") is that the employment of this technique was con-
sidered to have an advantage over a liquidation in the strict
insolvency law sense. This is true because, at least in some
instances, the businesses of some enterprises were able to be
continued and saved, thus enabling them to be sold on a going
4. See Vertrdg zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik uber die Herstellung der Einheit
Deutschlands-Einigungsvertrag [Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany
and the German Democratic Republic on Unification], art. 25(1), v. 31.8.1990,
F.R.G.-G.D.R. (Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI.] II S.889), translated in 30 I.L.M. 457,
481 (1991); Gesetz zur Privatisierung und Reorganisation des Volkseigenen
Vermogen-Treuhandgesetz [Law Concerning the Privatisation and Reorganisation of
the People's Property], v. 17.6.1990 (BGBl. I S.300); see also Ronald Winston
Harmer, Insolvency Laws and Reform in the People's Republic of China, 64
FORDHAA1 L. REV. 2563, 2586-88 (1996) (discussing the Treuhandanstalt); Rainer
Frank, Privatization in Eastern Germany: A Comprehensive Study, 27 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 809, 814 n.13, 819 n.45 (1994).
5. See Harmer, supra note 4, at 2587.
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concern basis without dismemberment. Furthermore, employ-
ment was maintained and, in some cases, preserved. That, as
will be soon observed, comes close to being a "rescue." So there
may be some subtle legal and economic message here which
suggests that notions of "liquidation" and "rescue" are more
labels than anything else and that the end result depends
more upon the practical nature of the process that is employed
rather than on its form, style or title.
II. RESCUE
There seems to be some real difficulty in the meaning or
definition of "rescue." In an insolvency law context, it is a word
of much more recent origin. It has been increasingly used in
many jurisdictions. But, one suspects, the word is used loosely
and more as a generic description of a variety of differing pro-
cesses which might effect different results. In some jurisdic-
tions, the rescue process appears to be a near neighbour of the
liquidation process; in other jurisdictions, those processes may
be at serious odds with one another.
Two things seem to stand out in the confusion. First, most
jurisdictions in which the word has come to be used have re-
cently experienced a process of legislative reform and develop-
ment in relation to their respective insolvency laws. It is not
surprising that those developments have been largely centered
upon corporations or enterprises of various juridical structures.
These, of course, are the modern "merchants and traders" and
the development of the law has been to encourage their surviv-
al, rather than summarily terminate them. This is what has
introduced a corporate or enterprise "rescue" regime to many
insolvency law systems.
Second, few of these countries actually describe their new
statutory regimes under the formal heading or description of
"rescue." Rather, a variety of terms are used, such as
"reorganisation," "rehabilitation," "restructuring," "arrange-
ment," "administration," "composition," "reconciliation," and,
even, "merger" or "acquisition." Inquiry into what is signified
by this variety suggests that they each delineate a formal
statutory regime which in some important ways is different
from that of liquidation. Moreover, when contrasted with liqui-
dation, it is suggested that these regimes can possibly produce
a better economic result in the administration of an insolvent
1997]
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corporation or enterprise. To this list of rescue regimes should
be added the informal "work out" device which has also been
heralded, at least in some quarters, as a rescue method. But it
is employed outside of, and sometimes due to the absence of, a
formal statutory rescue regime. This becomes particularly
relevant when considering trends in Japan.6
So, what is actually meant by "rescue" in the context of
corporate or enterprise insolvency, and what is its nature?
Those are difficult questions to answer, at least in terms that
might be universally acceptable. "Rescue" is possibly best ex-
plained by reflecting further on the growing product of the
fusion of contemporary legal and economic thought to insolven-
cy law.
It may be submitted that the most widely accepted goal of
an insolvency law system in contemporary times is to maxi-
mize the value of the assets of the debtor.' That statement
may appear trite and simplistic; however, in relation to corpo-
rate or enterprise insolvency, this goal has, increasingly and
sensibly, focused on the income-producing business unit(s) of
an enterprise. It rests on the view that the value or worth of
an insolvent enterprise will normally be worth more if this
business element can be preserved as an ongoing concern; so
why terminate or extinguish it? Put slightly differently, if a
form of bankruptcy or insolvency law regime can operate so as
to preserve and possibly enhance the value of the business
assets of an insolvent enterprise, then it would seem to fit the
broad concept of "rescue."
Thus viewed, "rescue" does not mean that an insolvent
enterprise is, literally, saved and fully restored, nor that the
main participants in the insolvency (the creditors and owners
of the enterprise) are eventually restored to their respective
pre-insolvent positions; that may, on very rare occasions, be
the result. But that which the various regimes and their differ-
ing descriptions all seek to signal is that through the applica-
tion of whatever techniques or mechanisms (which involves
certainly something other than the methodology of liquidation),
more value than that which might be obtained from the stan-
dard liquidation style sale of the assets of the enterprise will
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 28.
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be produced.
Care must be taken, however, because there can be some
considerable confusion between different regimes. Trebilock
and Katz, for example, in an article on corporate bankruptcy
regimes in North America,' describe a "reorganisation process"
in those jurisdictions as one "under which... claims are trad-
ed for new claims and ownership interests in... [a] ... going
concern."' They suggest that a reorganisation is characterised
by a "sale" of the assets of an enterprise to the creditors. A sale
of assets to third parties characterises a liquidation. This
seems to emphasise, if not require, that a "reorganisation," at
least in North America, necessarily results in creditors, or
some one or more of them, becoming in some way (for example
by debt/equity swap) "owners" of the enterprise.
A very recent example can be found in the Chapter 11
administration of the U.S. subsidiary of the failed Olympia &
York Developments of Toronto. It is reported that the subsid-
iary, which is soon to emerge under the new name of World
Financial Properties, has relinquished some of its assets, re-
structured US$5 billion of debt, will have US$3 billion of as-
sets, and will be owned by a group of former creditors who
have swapped debt for equity and invested additional loan
funds. It is thus "rescued" because its constituent parts are
kept together (in particular its core assets are not sold to third
parties); its insolvent financial position is resolved; and the
corporation continues.
While that may be a correct description of what in an ideal
sense is signaled by the word reorganisation and, perhaps, the
notion of rescue in North America, it may not necessarily cor-
respond to actual practice in those jurisdictions. There have
been, for example, a number of Chapter 11 liquidation
reorganisations in which the business and other assets of a
debtor corporation have been sold off to third parties as part of
the plan approved under the Chapter 11 administration.'0
8. Michael Trebilock & Jodi Katz, The Law and Economics of Corporate In-
solvency: A North American Perspective, in ESSAYS ON CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING
AND INSOLVENCY 1 (Charles Rickett ed., 1996).
9. Id.
10. See DAVID L. BUCHBINDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY: A LAWYER'S
GUIDE § 25.6, at 467 (1991); see also Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4)
(1994).
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Moreover, full satisfaction of the debts of creditors is rarely
achieved under Chapter 11 style administrations."
Nor would the description correspond to the notion of res-
cue in many other jurisdictions. In France, for example, the
title of its insolvency law rescue regime is "rehabilitation,"' 2
which is certainly rescue evocative. But rehabilitation in
France, on most occasions, is achieved by transferring or sell-
ing off the business of an insolvent enterprise as a going con-
cern, with or without its debt. In Australia, as will be seen, 3
and in England, the position is similar.
However, what the different cultures seem to have in com-
mon is that a formal process is established which is capable of
providing the opportunity for rationalising the business and
financial affairs of an enterprise. This would suggest that res-
cue is principally concerned with:
* the preservation of the income-producing business of
the enterprise; and
* the reduction, rescheduling, or extinguishment of debt
(for example, by write-off or by conversion of debt into
equity) according to the realistic capacity of the enter-
prise to bear it.
It does not necessarily follow that the enterprise itself
must be preserved and left intact. The overall aim is to provide
an environment that can best achieve the type of goal that the
application of contemporary legal and economic thought appear
to agree upon. That might also include, as a by-product, some
protection for wider interests, such as employees, markets for
suppliers, and the like.
Viewed in that way, a rescue can still produce one, more,
or all of the following seemingly negative results:
* a liquidation or sale of some or all of the assets of the
enterprise to third parties, including income-producing
business (remembering, however, that the environ-
ment of the rescue regime itself creates a more appro-
priate marketplace in which to obtain the best value
11. See BUCHBINDER, supra note 10, § 25.7, at 470.
12. Loi relative au redressement et A la liquidation judiciares des entreprises
[Law Relating to Judicial Rehabilitation and Judicial Liquidation], Law No. 85-98
of Jan. 25, 1985, Journal Officiel de la Republique Frangaise [J.O.], Jan. 26, 1985;
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] app. at 1001 (91st ed. Dalloz 1995-1996) (Fr.).
13. See infra Part III.
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for such assets);
" the ultimate extinguishment of the legal entity or
juridical form of the enterprise itself (because to seek
the preservation of the legal entity is, at best, a sub-
sidiary or incidental prospect or possibility only),
which may come about by a later formal liquidation or
bankruptcy of the enterprise;
" the total extinguishment of owner "equity" (because
that "interest" must, of necessity, be secondary to the
interests of creditors unless, of course, the owners are
prepared to support the preservation of their interests
in the enterprise by obtaining the injection of further
capital or debt funding);
" the removal of power from, and the possible replace-
ment or dismissal of, some or all of management (par-
ticularly because in many jurisdictions their business
ability will, at the very least, be suspect);
* the ultimate retrieval, followed by the exercise, of
rights of various classes of creditors (particularly cred-
itors who hold security over assets of the enterprise),
which may have been suspended or curtailed as a
result of the effect of the employment of the formal
"rescue" process; and
* a compromise or composition of debt owed to creditors
(for it is rare that even a "rescue" that is highly re-
garded as "successful" will result in actual payment of
debt in full).
Thus, rescue is not necessarily about preservation or reha-
bilitation of the corporate entity or other juridical form through
which the enterprise functions. And while it may be important
to endeavour to avoid some of the above effects, that should
not be regarded as primary goals of the procedure.
Another approach toward finding not so much a meaning
for rescue but a legislative approach which actively encourages
a rescue, might be to examine whether the insolvency law
regime is debtor or creditor friendly. If, as in the United
States, the regime is largely debtor-driven then, one might con-
clude, the prospect and opportunity for the rescue of the debtor
corporation itself is greater, since to a large degree the debtor
is presented with a potentially powerful position from which to
negotiate. But if, as for example in Australia, it is more credi-
tor-driven, then there is less prospect of a corporate rescue. In
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this aspect, it is relevant to note the presence, as in the United
States for example, of correlative legislative provisions that are
principally geared toward facilitating and not hampering deals
to be structured to enable the debtor to survive. Thus, the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code contains provisions which curtail the opera-
tion of state laws which might otherwise interfere with a res-
cue plan, and other provisions which modify or substantially
reduce the impact of other federal laws dealing with securities
control and taxation. 4 All of this is focused on the prospect of
preserving the debtor corporation.
One is forced to suspect that the use of the word "rescue"
is apt to conjure up more in the mind of the beholder than is
actually represented. Rescue may not be the most appropriate
generic description of the variety of insolvency regimes which
have emerged. Still, it has become a somewhat universal term
and we may as well continue with it.
Finally, the relative speed and enthusiasm by which the
rescue culture has come to exist and spread is somewhat re-
markable. The revision and development of insolvency laws is
normally paralysingly slow; but that has not been the case in
relation to the rescue regimes. It is also clear that the rescue
culture has been developed for the benefit of those engaged in
trade and commerce, i.e., for the modern merchants and trad-
ers, as mentioned before. This is in unfortunate contrast with
the lack of development of enlightened approaches to the
equally alive and contemporary problem of consumer bank-
ruptcy. Indeed, attention to this considerable area, which has
been spread by the growth of the credit economy, is almost ab-
sent. Might the reason for this be (and might one thus con-
clude almost with the same line which opened this part of the
paper) that the development of insolvency laws is dictated and
heavily influenced solely by reference to the needs of mer-
chants and traders?
III. AUSTRALIA
Until relatively recently, Australian approaches to insol-
vency law took their character and form from English insolven-
cy law models. For a long time, the standard bankruptcy pro-
cess was used to deal with insolvent individuals, but liquida-
14. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1145-1146 (1994).
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tion was used for insolvent companies. There was very little
else available. A "private" administration of an insolvent com-
pany could be imposed by a secured creditor through the ap-
pointment of a receiver, which might sometimes result in
something approaching a rescue, but, otherwise, these forms of
administration rarely benefited anyone other than the secured
creditor. There was also available an elaborate labour and cost
intensive "scheme of arrangement" process which, at least on
paper, offered a prospect of corporate rescue. But it was an
inefficient and expensive proces-s that was seldom employed.
Then, in the 1960s, two developments occurred. One was
the introduction of a process which offered insolvent individu-
als engaged in small business an alternative to bankruptcy.
Under a formal but commercially efficient statutory process it
was possible for a debtor to agree to an arrangement with the
creditors. This offered the prospect of preserving the business
of the debtor. The other development involved the importation
of the South African device of judicial management" into Aus-
tralian corporate insolvency law. 5 In Australia, it was termed
"Official Management" and was fashioned as a relatively in-
formal process in an attempt to improve on the more formal
scheme of arrangement process. 6 It offered the prospect of
saving the company and its business operations.'
Of these two innovations, the former was extremely suc-
cessful, the latter a remarkable failure. Official management
failed because it required that the debts of the debtor corpora-
tion be paid in full. 8 By comparison, the arrangements pro-
cess for individual debtors was successful because it enabled
the debtor and the creditors to shape whatever form of ar-
rangement might be mutually agreed.'9 The success of this
approach and the failure of the official management process
15. See Ron Harmer, An Overview of Recent Developments and Future Pros-
pects in Australia (With Some Reference to New Zealand and Asia), in CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW
39, 40 (Jacob S. Ziegel & Susan I. Cantile eds., 1994).
16. See id. at 40-41.
17. See id. at 41.
18. See id. at 41; see also 1 AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMISSION, REPORT
No. 45, GENERAL INSOLVENCY INQUIRY 26 (1988) [hereinafter ALRC REPORT].
19. See Bankruptcy Act, 1966, pt. X, para. 962 (Austl.), reprinted in C.
DARVALL & N.T.F. FERNON, AUSTRALIAN BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 7021-22
(5th ed. 1977); Harmer, supra note 15, at 41; ALRC REPORT, supra note 18, at 25.
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led to proposals that something like the arrangements process
should become part of the corporate insolvency law.2" It would
need to be less ambitious than official management and more
efficient and practical than that available under the schemes of
arrangement procedure. Importantly, however, the proposals
for a new and more efficient regime were largely based on
economic arguments concerned with the goal of maximising the
value of the business of the corporation and the wider social
and related aims of preserving employment and markets.21 If
the corporation might be "saved" in the process, then so much
the better, but it was not a goal in itself. Drawing on the bene-
fit of the earlier insolvency rescue regime developments in the
United States and in England, a new form of corporate insol-
vency procedure termed "Voluntary Administration" became
available in Australia in 1993.22
As to its appropriate place in the liquidation/rescue
categorisation, it might be best described as highly purposeful
toward saving business and maximising returns to creditors,
but also providing the opportunity in an appropriate case for
the restructure and reorganisation of the debtor company it-
self.' Thus, it would qualify, at least in terms of the descrip-
tions mentioned earlier in this paper, as a rescue regime. This
particular regime has now been active for some three years. It
is therefore appropriate to focus on its performance to date.
Judged solely by bare statistics, it seems to have enjoyed
considerable, if not remarkable, success. The statistics show24
that the number of liquidations has dropped remarkably; the
level of receiverships is relatively static; and the bulk of finan-
cially distressed companies has been dealt with under the
administration regime.
Some compelling numbers may be extracted from the offi-
cial figures. One year prior to the introduction of voluntary
administration, Australian corporate insolvency was clearly in
the warp of the "liquidation" process. For example, in May
20. See Harmer, supra note 15, at 41.
21. See ALRC REPORT, supra note 18, at 28.
22. See Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, pt. 5.3A (Austl.); see also Harmer,
supra note 15, at 40, 42.
23. See Harmer, supra note 15, at 43.
24. The official figures concerning the level of corporate insolvency in Austra-
lia as released by the Australian Securities Commission are attached as an Appen-
dix at pp. 164-65.
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1992 there were 400 cases of insolvent liquidations and just
two cases of schemes of arrangement. In May 1993 (immedi-
ately prior to the introduction of voluntary administration) the
numbers were 380 cases of insolvent liquidation and not one
case of a scheme of arrangement. But by May 1994, voluntary
administration was having some considerable effect. The num-
ber of insolvent liquidation cases had fallen to 194; there were
no schemes of arrangement; and the cases of voluntary admin-
istration numbered 134. In May 1995, the figures were 222
liquidations and 239 voluntary administrations. By May 1996,
the number of liquidation cases had fallen to ninety-seven and
the number of voluntary administrations was constant at 240.
Of course, some allowance has to be made for a number of
influencing factors, including changing economic conditions
over that period of four years. Even so, the fact is that volun-
tary administrations now account for about sixty-five percent
of cases of corporate insolvency. And, importantly, the statis-
tics suggest that about one half of that number results in a
permanent non-liquidation form of arrangement for the compa-
ny.
The actual commercial results of successful administra-
tions are not as apparent. There is some fair evidence to show
that the businesses of many companies have been preserved
and saved (more often by sale to a third party as a going con-
cern, but sometimes preserved for the benefit of the insolvent
company as a result of capital injections from existing and
newly introduced equity holders). It also seems that successful
administrations have produced a greater return to creditors
(estimated to be, on average, three to four times better) than if
the company had been liquidated. That indicia itself suggests
that flow on effects, such as preservation of markets and a
saving in unemployment, have probably also been achieved.
And so far, there is no evidence of any "repeat" business from
companies that have undergone the voluntary administration
process.
The probable reasons for this success are varied. The first
involves certain aspects of the procedure. These may be
summarised as follows:
* The Comparative Ease of Initiation. The procedure
may be invoked by the directors of a company that is
19971
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insolvent or which is likely to become so.' The direc-
tors appoint an administrator by signing a simple
form; there is no court "filing."26 Rather, the docu-
ment of appointment is lodged with the corporate
regulatory authority (the Australian Securities Com-
mission) and publicised as required in the relevant
regulations." It thus offers a convenient and
straightforward method of initiation.
" The Absence of Involvement of the Courts. The courts
are not involved in the initiation nor the ongoing pro-
cessing of the procedure, but they may exercise, if re-
quired, both a facilitating and supervisory jurisdic-
tion. 8 This, in itself, reduces the formality of the pro-
cedure and saves time and expenses. The decision
making is left largely to the principal partici-
pants-the company and its creditors.
* The Intervention of a Qualified Licensed Administra-
tor. This functionary (considered to be important in
the Australian environment) is appointed by the direc-
tors to take control of the company and its property.
The administrator becomes the pivotal force of the
procedure. The administrator is required to carry out
an investigation into the financial position and affairs
of the company and, ultimately, to make a recommen-
dation about the future of the company."0 This would
normally involve a recommendation that either the
company be liquidated or that terms of an ar-
rangement between the company and its creditors be
considered and possibly adopted by the creditors.3'
The "management" of the company is suspended from
ultimate control of the affairs of the company, though
it may remain in office and continue to operate the
business of the company under the control of the ad-
ministrator. 2 Both management and equity holders
25. See Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, pt. 5.3A, § 436A (Austl.).
26. See Harmer, supra note 15, at 43.
27. See id.
28. See id at 46.
29. See Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, pt. 5.3A, §§ 473A-473B (Austl.).
30. See Harmer, supra note 15, at 44.
31. See id.
32. See Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, pt. 5.3A, § 437C (Austl.).
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may seek to influence the terms of a possible arrange-
ment for the company, but they do not control the
forum for that purpose.
* The Moratorium, Prohibiting Action Against the Com-
pany and Its Property. With one notable exception,3
the appointment of the administrator effects a stay of
action and proceedings against the company and its
property.34 The moratorium extends to lessors of
property used or occupied by the company,3 5 as well
as secured creditors and suppliers of goods who have
dealt with the company on a retention of title basis.36
This is designed to preserve the business and assets of
the company as the procedure unfolds through its
successive stages.37
* The Limited Time Frame Which Controls All Aspects
of the Procedure. The procedure is governed by tight
time limits. The moratorium, for example, operates
only up to the time within which a meeting of credi-
tors is convened and held for the purpose of determin-
ing the fate of the company.38 This would normally be
no longer than thirty-five days from the date of the
appointment of the administrator.3 1 It may be ex-
tended by the courts for appropriate cause.40 This
creates a "ticking clock" for both the creditors and the
debtor and is designed to encourage a speedy and
early determination of the future of the company.
* The Decision-Making Power of the Creditors in Gener-
al Meetings. The creditors (in all their number and
variety) have the power to commit the company to a
liquidation (that regime is automatically substituted if
the creditors so resolve) or to negotiate, with the assis-
tance of the administrator, for terms of an arrange-
33. See Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, pt. 5.3A, § 440D(1) (Austl.); see also
infra notes 44-45.
34. See Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, pt. 5.3A, § 440D(1) (Austl.).
35. See id. § 440C.
36. See Harmer, supra note 15, at 44.
37. See id. at 43.
38. See id. at 45.
39. See id.
40. See Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, pt. 5.3A, § 439A(6) (Austl.).
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ment.4' The form of an arrangement is not prescribed
and may take any form, provided that its terms of it
do not offend cardinal legalities.
The "Guardian" Provisions in the Legislation. The
guardian provisions permit the court to terminate an
arrangement which will not be performed or an ar-
rangement that has been effected through improper
methods (such as a violation of the procedure, the
"stacking" of votes of persons connected with the com-
pany and so forth). The court also has power to vary
the terms of an arrangement by consensus.42
The procedure is thus designed to be, and appears to be,
generally regarded as commercially efficient and expedient.
Another reason for the statistical success of the regime has
been the apparent willingness of the courts to give as much
practical effect to the legislation as possible in cases of doubt
or contention. The reported cases (there have been a num-
ber)43 frequently contain judicial statements referring to the
commercial purposes and intent of the legislation. They reflect
the endeavour of the courts to give the legislation sensible and
practical application.
The new regime has also been helped by the attitude of
secured financiers (mainly the banks). To accommodate the
realities of commercial financial life in Australia, the legisla-
tion governing voluntary administration provides for an excep-
tion to the effect of the general moratorium." This exception
favours a creditor who holds security over all the property of a
company (the holder of a "floating" charge over the property of
a company). That class of creditor must be given immediate
notice of the appointment of an administrator and that creditor
may then elect (within a period of ten days) whether to enforce
the security (by, for example, appointing a receiver to the se-
41. See id. § 439C.
42. See id. § 440A(2).
43. See, e.g., Deputy Comm'r of Taxation of Austl. v. Comcorp Austl. Pty. Ltd.
(1996) 14 Austl. Co. L. Cas. 1616 (LEXIS, Aust Library, Ausmax File); Foxcroft v.
Ink Group Pty. Ltd. (1994) 12 Austl. Co. L. Cas. 1063 (LEXIS, Aust Library,
Ausmax File); J & B Records Ltd. v. Brashs Pty. Ltd. (1994) 13 Austl. Corp. &
Sec. L.R. (CCH) 680 (LEXIS, Aust Library, Ausmax File); Cawthorn v. Kiera
Constrs. Pty. Ltd. (1994) 33 N.S.W.L.R. 607; Mann v. Abruzzi Sports Club Ltd.
(1994) 12 Austl. Corp. & Sec. L.R. (CCH) 611 (LEXIS, Aust Library, Ausmax File).
44. See Harmer, supra note 15, at 44.
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cured property). If the security is enforced within that pre-
scribed time, the secured creditor is able to deal with all the
property of the company covered by the security to the exclu-
sion of the administrator. But the administrator remains in
office, although the prospect of being able to reach an arrange-
ment between the company and its creditors will then be
slight. If the secured creditor does not elect to enforce the secu-
rity, the creditor is bound by the moratorium.45 Initially, it
was feared that the banks would take unlimited advantage of
this exception to the moratorium and undermine the operation
of the new regime; in practice, however, this does not seem to
have been the event. There have been many instances where
banks have not enforced their security rights and some in-
stances, even, when banks have actively encouraged the com-
pany to appoint an administrator.
Another factor that may be attributed with some indirect
connection to the apparent success of the new regime concerns
a change in the attitude of directors of near-insolvent compa-
nies. Part of the legislative reform package imposed more effec-
tive personal liability on directors for trade and revenue debts
of the company brought about by insolvent trading.46 The ef-
fect of this, coupled with the ease of initiation of the new pro-
cedure, has encouraged directors to take a more responsible
attitude toward the financial problems of a company and to act
more promptly.
None of this should be taken to suggest that there are no
criticisms to be made of, nor concerns about, the new regime.
The comparative informality of the procedure is open to abuse,
and it has been abused, but the incident rate seems reasonably
low at this stage. The legislation has had teething problems
and some amendment and modification is necessary. Doubts
have been raised about the apparent statistical success of the
procedure because of the number of administrations that be-
come liquidations (around fifty percent) and the lack of quality
measurement of the so-called successes. But the evidence over-
all seems to indicate that the commercial community views
this formal "rescue" procedure favourably.
45. See id. at 44.
46. See CHRISTOPHER BEVAN, INSOLVENT TRADING 137 (1994).
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IV. JAPAN
The most striking trend in Japan has been the absence of
use of formal rescue (and, for that matter, liquidation) process-
es and the use of informal "rescue" processes." There has not
been a significant change to Japanese formal insolvency proce-
dures since the Corporate Reorganisation Act of 1952.48 This
legislation was, in effect, modelled on the pre-1978 Chapter X
procedure of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act.4" In its form and ob-
ject, it may be regarded as a "rescue" regime, particularly for
large companies. Yet, the statistical evidence of its actual em-
ployment suggests that it is rarely used and that, instead,
more informal rescue processes are applied. There seems to be
a number of reasons for this.
The first reason has to do with Japanese society and cul-
ture. The values of that society generally lead to constructive,
informal discussion and negotiation of commercial and other
issues through which solutions may be found and a settlement
reached.0 This acts as a disincentive to use legal proceedings
to determine issues. That, coupled with a fairly high degree of
protective intervention at both the government and financial
industry levels (the latter involves the Japanese financing
banks which, invariably, will have a stockholder stake in their
customer enterprises), will often protect enterprises from a
formal insolvency administration, even though they may be
insolvent, and, indeed, may preclude the concerted initiation of
47. See Tasuku Matsuo & Richard Vilet, Creditor's Rights Under Japanese
Law, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA
202, 208 (John Owen Haley ed., 1978).
48. Kaisha K6seih6 [Corporate Reorganisation Act], Law No. 172 of 1952 (Ja-
pan); see Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter 11?
The Evidence From Japan, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 15, at 215, 219.
49. See Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 48, at 219-20; Yukiko Hasebe, The
Position of Creditors in the Distribution of Insolvent Estates: Consensual Secured
Creditors in Japan, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPAR-
ATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, supra note 15, at 403, 404 n.8; Tasuko
Matsuo, The Commercial Laws of Japan, in DIGEST OF COZMIERCIAL LAWS OF THE
WORLD 1, 79 (Lester Nelson ed., 1992).
50. See Yasuharu Nagashima & Aki Saito, Commercial Dispute Resolution, in
THE LAW OF COM1MERCE IN JAPAN 97, 98 (Haig Oghigian ed., 1993); Lynn Berat,
The Role of Conciliation in the Japanese Legal System, in COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW
AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 487, 487-88 (Kenneth L. Port ed., 1996); Akira
Ueno, Social, Economic and Political Trends in Japan, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS
OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA, supra note 47, at 24, 27.
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a formal insolvency legal process. This somewhat
institutionalised, "informal" process possibly explains the com-
paratively low statistical rate of enterprise "formal" insolvency
for such a large commercial market economy.
A second factor may be evident from the extent of the
involvement of courts and judges to guide and assist in media-
tion and compromise and, in many instances, to control effec-
tive reorganisation.51 This is particularly noticeable in actual
practice of the Corporate Reorganisation Law." Like the Aus-
tralian administration regime, it is primarily a voluntary pro-
cedure initiated by the company itself (it may also be invoked,
though this is rare, by shareholders or creditors who have a
minimum percentage of share holding or debt).53 Unlike the
Australian procedure, it is initiated by a formal court filing.'
However, the usual practice in Japan is that informal, confi-
dential discussions are conducted with the court before any
filing is made and the court will sometimes make informal
contact with major creditors.55 This seems designed to test the
strength of support for a possible reorganisation and even to
determine whether there are other informal avenues available
for the company; of course, if this happens, the application is
withdrawn. If, however, the application is filed, the court will
conduct interviews with the chief executives and employees of
the company and secured and other creditors. A judge will
usually also visit the main business operations of the company.
The process is slow especially when it is considered that the
court, in undertaking these tasks, is determining whether or
not to accept or dismiss the application for reorganisation; the
actual proposal and plan for reorganisation will only come
later. It is reported that the average time for this interim deci-
sion is up to six months.56
51. See John 0. Haley, Dispute Resolution in Japan: Lessons in Autonomy, in
COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN, supra note 49, at 483,
485.
52. See Matsuo, supra note 49, at 80.
53. See Corporate Reorganisation Act, Law No. 172 of 1952, art. 30(1)-(2) (Ja-
pan); Matsuo, supra note 48, at 80.
54. See Matsuo, supra note 49, at 80; see also Matsuo & Vliet, supra note 47,
at 210.
55. See Matsuo, supra note 49, at 80.
56. See Koji Takeuchi, Japanese Insolvency Law, in MULTNATIONAL COMMER-
CIAL INSOLVENCY M-1, M-4 (1993).
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It may be for this reason that the reorganisation procedure
in Japan is sometimes seen, particularly by financiers, as the
system of "last resort." Most reorganisations appear to be fash-
ioned through informal processes, influenced, if not led, by a
leading financier or "main" bank. It is here that the real shape
of insolvency trends in Japan may be best identified. The trend
is clearly toward rescue, but not through a formal legal process
and certainly not through the application of an insolvency law.
Of course, it may be that the informal rescue device is encour-
aged by the knowledge that there does exist, if all else fails, a
statutory formal insolvency process.
There is some evidence of emerging resistance to this in-
formal technique. The nature of corporate governance with its
heavy domination and dependence on share holding financiers
in Japan seems to be changing. There are signs of rising re-
sentment to this, not only by chief executives, but also by cred-
itor classes. Furthermore, there are some suggestions that the
culture of "employment for life" in Japanese enterprises is
weakening and employees are less dependent on the survival
of enterprises. The continued emergence of these undercur-
rents could result in some fundamental changes to the insol-
vency laws to provide a more efficient and expeditious "commu-
nal" form of formal rescue administration.
V. VIETNAM AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Bankruptcy law and practice in both Vietnam and China
is, at present, viewed primarily as part of the legal and micro
economic infrastructure required for the macro economic tran-
sition process that is steadily taking effect in both countries.
Although this transition involves the abandonment of
command economics and the adoption of a market economy
framework, it should be observed that the nature of the eco-
nomic renovation or reform, which has taken place in these
two countries during the last decade or so, is quite different
from that which has occurred in countries that emerged from
the collapse of the economic and political systems previously
practised in the former Soviet Union and its satellites. Neither
Vietnam nor China has so altered their respective basic politi-
cal and social attitudes to the point of embracing a "market
economy." Rather, their respective ideals are centered on es-
tablishing a "socialist" market economy. So, while there is a
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heavy commitment to reform the state enterprise system of
production, neither country is prepared to countenance the
privatisation or the dismemberment of the state enterprise
sector. To the contrary, in both countries, the retention of state
enterprises is considerably vital to the retention of socialist
political ideals. This is a fundamental which differentiates
Vietnam and China from many other former "command" econo-
my countries.
Even so, the reform of the economies of Vietnam and Chi-
na has meant considerable internal institutional upheaval in
the state enterprise sector. Although it has been a "gradualist"
process and is far from complete, the aim of this reform is to
equip the state enterprise sector to take its place in a competi-
tive market.57 This has required that the state give up its con-
trol of and abandon subsidies and financial support for state
enterprises. It has resulted in the introduction of autonomy
into the sector along with management responsibility.58 The
process has advanced to the point where many state enterpris-
es in both countries have been corporatised.59 A not insignifi-
cant by-product of all of this has been the exposure of a consid-
erable section of the state enterprise sector as inefficient, in-
competent, and insolvent. Inevitably, the question then was
what to do with them. It is here that the development of insol-
vency laws in both countries became important, as illustrated
by this observation:
The practice of bankruptcy, in fact, realises the principle of
the state enterprises assuming responsibility for the profits
and losses and the state subject only to limited liabilities.
Meantime it helps the flow of state assets in the market
through trading and non-trading channels and the establish-
ment of a social security system."
What form were these insolvency laws to take? Neither
57. See Harmer, supra note 4, at 2576; Geoffrey Murray, China Makes New
Bid to Rescue State-Owned Enterprises, Japan Economic Newswire, May 25, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
58. See Harmer, supra note 4, at 2577.
59. See id.; see also William C. Kirby, China Unincorporated: Company Law
and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century China, 54 J. ASIAN STUD. 43, 52
(1995).
60. Q-G Jiang, Enterprise System Reform in China, in ASIA-PAcIFIc ECONOMIC
LAW FORUMI PAPERS 5 (1994) (on file with author).
19971 159
BROOK. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XXIII:I
country has had much, if any, exposure to or knowledge of an
insolvency law."' In that circumstance, it might have been
expected that the governments of both countries might have
simply taken administrative measures to deal with problem
state enterprises, by either termination, merger with or acqui-
sition by other enterprises (similar to the technique adopted in
Germany through the Treuhandanstalt)."2 In part, this was
attempted. In Vietnam, for example, there were a number of
administrative directions given for the "liquidation" of insol-
vent state enterprises between 1989 and 1992, but these seem
to have been ineffective. They were certainly largely ignored.
In the end, both China and Vietnam elected to introduce insol-
vency laws of the "traditional" style to deal with insolvent
state enterprises.
The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of 1986 of China was the
first;63 it applies only to state enterprises." Chapter XIX of
the Chinese Code of Civil Procedure Law of 1991 attempts to
deal with the insolvency of legal person enterprises other than
state enterprises." In Vietnam, the Law on Business Bank-
ruptcy was approved in December 1994.66 Although it extends
to all forms of enterprise, it is primarily directed at state en-
terprises.67
61. For a detailed discussion of this point in relation to China, see Harmer,
supra note 4, at 2563-65.
62. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
63. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Pochanfa [Law of the People's Republic
of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy] (promulgated Dec. 2, 1986, effective Nov. 1,
1988, 18th Sess. of the Standing Comm. of the 6th National People's Congress)
[hereinafter Enterprise Bankruptcy Law], translated in 2 CHINA LAWS FOR FOR-
EIGN BUSINESS: BUSINEss REGULATION g 13-522, at 16,869 (CCH Austl.); see Harm-
er, supra note 4, at 2569-70.
64. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 2; see Harmer, supra note 4, at 2569.
65. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law of
the People's Republic of China], arts. 199-206 (promulgated & effective Apr. 9,
1991), 1991 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Gongbao [Gazette of the
State Council of the People's Republic of China] 481, translated in CHINA L. &
PRAC., June 17, 1991, at 15; see Harmer, supra note 4, at 2570.
66. Law on Business Bankruptcy (promulgated Dec. 30, 1993, 4th Sess. of the
9th Legislature) (Vietnam) [hereinafter Business Bankruptcy Law], translated in 3
FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS OF VIETNAM, sec. XIV, at 47 (1994); see Decree on
Implementation of Law on Business Bankruptcy, No. 189-CP, ch. 1, Dec. 23, 1994
(Vietnam) [hereinafter Business Bankruptcy Decree] (implementing regulations of
the Law on Business Bankruptcy), translated in 3 FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS OF
VIETNAM, supra, sec. XIV, at 201.
67. See Business Bankruptcy Law, supra note 66, art. 1; Business Bankruptcy
Decree, supra note 66, art. 1(a)-(h).
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Both the Chinese and Vietnamese laws feature a bank-
ruptcy "review" system which provides the opportunity for
rescue or liquidation." The Vietnamese law is the more ad-
vanced of the two. It provides for a process under which an
insolvent enterprise may apply for bankruptcy review;69 an
asset retaining team is appointed to preserve the assets;0 the
enterprise may continue its operations and any "new" debt is
given absolute priority;7' the enterprise may submit a plan
which is then voted on by creditors;72 if it is approved (a high
positive vote is required), the bankruptcy proceedings are "sus-
pended" pending performance;" the plan may be of any na-
ture; if a plan is not proposed, or approved, or fails, the court
declares the enterprise bankrupt.'4 The Chinese law follows
something of a similar pattern, though it is far less detailed
and does not give appropriate weight to the prospect of "res-
cue."
7 5
Unfortunately, the use of an insolvency law as an instru-
ment of economic reform tends to both obscure and frustrate
the appropriate application of the law, whether viewed in an
essentially historical "liquidation" sense (as a measure to give
effect to a free competitive market) or in the more modern le-
gal/economic framework (to provide a possible "rescue" frame-
work). The record of the actual application of these insolvency
laws, particularly in China, which has had by far the longer
exposure, has not been all that inspiring. There is clear evi-
dence in China of intense government control and intervention
which reaches the point (since that is what the law itself pro-
vides) of requiring that a state enterprise need something
approaching a "license" from the state to submit itself to the
insolvency law process. 76 But this is explicable. There are in-
sufficient supporting mechanisms in China to permit the insol-
vency law to operate as it might. Chief among these is the
68. See Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 63, arts. 17-20, 23-24; Busi-
ness Bankruptcy Law, supra note 66, arts. 20, 36.
69. Business Bankruptcy Law, supra note 66, art. 9(1).
70. Business Bankruptcy Decree, supra note 66, arts. 17-19.
71. Business Bankruptcy Law, supra note 66, art. 23.
72. Id. arts. 28, 31(1).
73. Id. arts. 33-35.
74. Id. art. 36(1), (3).
75. See Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 63, arts. 17-22.
76. See Harmer, supra note 4, at 2578.
1997]
BROOK. J. INTL L.
absence of a sufficient social welfare system to address the
quite massive social and political problem of unemployment
that would certainly result if the insolvency law was permitted
to operate according to the normal dictates of market condi-
tions. 7 Moreover, the economic and financial problems that
affect many state enterprises are systemic in nature, almost
totally unsuited to cure, remedy, or relief through any insol-
vency process.78
The Chinese government has recognised the difficulties
and proposes the enactment of a new law which will extend to
all forms of legal entities and which will place heavy emphasis
upon reconstruction techniques. However, in relation to the
state enterprise sector, reform to the insolvency law will be
ineffectual unless it is accompanied by considerable and criti-
cal reform to social welfare; the advancement of modern ac-
counting and financial practices; and a way around the prob-
lems of triangular debt and leftover bank debt.
Before leaving China it is relevant to mention Hong Kong.
It will become part of China on June 30, 1997.7" It will be a
unique occasion, not the least because of the "one country, two
systems" approach to the law and its administration. It raises
interesting and important questions for Hong Kong (or the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, as it will be known)
and for China in implementing this "one nation, two systems"
principle as established by the Sino-British Joint Declaration
of September 1984.0 Particular interest centres on the man-
ner in which the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
tration, enacted in April 1990 to take effect on July 1, 1997,
will operate. It essentially preserves the continued operation of
existing Hong Kong laws and provides for a limited right of
further legislating. In that environment, the Hong Kong gov-
ernment is presently contemplating the introduction of a new
77. See id. at 2565-66.
78. See id. at 2563.
79. The approach of midnight on June 30, 1997 has been cartooned by ven-
dors of T-shirts at the Star Ferry terminal in Hong Kong as the "Greatest Chi-
nese Take-Away" on Earth. See James Pringle, Colony in Despair at 'Chinese
Takeaway', TIMES (London), Aug. 19, 1996, at 8.
80. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of
China on the Question of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, U.I-P.R.C., 1985 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 9543), 23 I.L.M. 1366, at 1 [hereinafter Sino-British Joint
Declaration].
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form of "administration" insolvency regime (based on the rec-
ommendations of the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission
published in 1995).8" It remains to be seen whether this will
become the event. If it does, Hong Kong will have a modern
and quite sophisticated "rescue" technique available with
which to treat insolvent or near insolvent companies. Enter-
prises in the rest of China, on the other hand, will be dealt
with under the Chinese insolvency law which, as mentioned
above, is a decidedly problematical affair. Interesting questions
will also arise in relation to cross-border insolvency issues
because of the degree of Chinese investment in Hong Kong
companies; the presence of companies in Hong Kong controlled
by Chinese shareholders (and vice versa); and various business
interests held by Chinese and Hong Kong enterprises across
the "border." Which law will apply and will there be recogni-
tion of cross-border insolvency cases?
81. LAW REFORM COMIISSION OF THE HONG KONG SUBCOMMImTEE ON INSOL-
VENCY, CORPORATE RESCUE AND INSOLVENT TRADING CONSULTATION PAPER (1995).
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AUSTRALIAN CORPORATE
Date Pructuknal cowt CreditoW Member.
LSqidin Ludation Lquda. on Lquiat
Nov-91 52 357 74 273
Dec.91 65 337 68 46
Jn-92 29 188 45 242
Feb-92 66 197 62 218
Ma.92 50 618 94 316
Apr-92 12 590 76 316
May-92 6 3 64 337
Jun-92 60 350 80 2
Jul-92 39 309 82 248
Aug-92 so 365 68 219
Sep-92 35 310 57 196
Oct-92 60 506 58 200
Nov-92 34 320 63 251
Dec.92 19 318 63 353
Jan-93 33 191 47 148
Feb-93 50 227 s6 1s3
Mar-93 85 330 83 330
Apr-93 45 246 90 309
May-93 49 303 77 370
Jun-93 53 237 66 614
Jul-93 30 248 51 219
Aug-3 30 196 72 187
Sep-93 32 216 53 181
Oct-93 25 217 40 197
Nov-93 34 117 59 213
Dec-93 25 168 48 374
Jan-94 13 119 17 127
Feb-94 .4 92 30 151
Mar-94 38 167 50 331
Apr-94 12 129 35 212
MaY-94 14 158 36 238
Jun-94 12 165 34 493
Jul-94 2. 154 33 207
Ang-94 19 162 44 193
Sep-94 18 150 39 184
Oct-94 16 163 29 147
Nov-94 18 154 28 248
Dec-9 13 138 38 34
Jan-95 10 107 26 131
Feb-95 15 137 28 13
Br-95 14 159 40 248
Ap-95 12 92 34 178
May-93 12 173 49 290
Jun-95 22 142 44 688
Jul-93 10 68 31 219
Ang-95 62 92 38 192
Sep-95 18 S0 50 241
Oct-90 17 58 34 163
Nov-93 s0 57 33 230
Dec.93 21 31 42 324
Jan-96 1 18 23 1S
Feb.9 14 12 38 225
Mar-96 20 42 39 288
Apr-96 13 54 38 275
May-96 18 63 34 346
Jun96 is 57 46 518
Jul-96 15 62 49 258
ece e r-Otheor
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INSOLVENCY STATISTICS 1991-1996
Data Receivr & Scheme Ad- CkuipanyAd- Ded Ad- Forcign Total Incorpor-
Maager ministratm zeluir en1.tator Liqldation atIM
Nov-91 57 0 1 85 3789
Dec-91 93 4 1 1044 2944
Jan-92 58 0 0 569 3137
Feb-92 49 1 0 803 3830
Mar-92. 78 0 0 1176 311
Apr-92 48 9 2 1108 3659
May-92 77 2 0 889 4S27
Jun-92 89 0 1 1313 7547
Jul-92 58 1 0 743 4718
Aug-92 93 1 0 797 3832
Sep-92 72 0 0 678 4174
Oct-92 78 2 0 70 4101
Nov-92 67 7 0 750 3945
Dec-92 69 4 0 868 402
Jan-93 38 0 1 462 3550
Feb-93 40 0 1 544 4598
Mar-93 67 1 0 887 5405
Apr-93 64 0 1 758 4638
May-93 89 0 0 899 8052
Jun-93 74 3 3 0 0 1064 11422
Jul-93 55 5 44 2 0 708 633
Aug-93 44 3 37 13 1 638 5742
Sep-93 75 2 50 18 0 686 5797
Oct-93 88 1 48 24 0 682 5383
Nov-93 43 9 61 20 0 689 5993
Dec-93 45 2 68 47 0 817 5244
Jan-94 39 2 62 21 0 447 4654
Feb-94 48 10 84 33 0 505 6387
Mar-94 47 1 as 30 0 695 7333
Apr-94 37 3 65 48 0 579 5820
May-94 38 0 89 45 0 678 8384
Ju-94 38 7 69 47 1 909 16000
Jul-94 29 0 69 49 0 609 6451
Aug-94 45 2 76 37 0 596 6088
Sep-94 32 2 71 48 0 608 5868
Oct-94 43 3 83 30 0 53 5736
Nov-94 29 3 96 45 0 685 6096
Dec-94 34 5 89 52 1 744 5375
Jan.95 25 1 73 37 0 437 5001
Feb-95 41 0 120 42 0 547 6110
Mar-95 48 a 183 73 0 814 8584
Apr-95 28 4 97 55 0 931 5227
May-95 28 6 197 82 0 829 7421
Jun-95 30 5 142 82 0 118 13779
Jul-95 25 1 98 107 0 898 5620
Aug-95 45 2 155 54 0 674 5886
Sep-95 53 0 108 54 1 601 552
Oct-95 20 2 135 58 1 531 5786
Nov-95 33 1 138 64- 0 611 5731
Dec-95 22 0 111 71 0 648 4865
Jan-96 31 1 97 33 0 432 5662
Feb-96 30 1 168 39 0 605 6788
Mar-96 s0 0 17 80 0 881 8730
Apr-98 39 2 126 62 0 632 604
May-96 42 2 157 83 0 774 8069
Jun-96 28 3 127 64 0 920 12386
Jul-98 45 2 182 71 0 703 8673

